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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CAPITAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION
Norman Lefstein
I want to make a couple of preliminary comments about the Report. First, while my
comments are a critique of some parts of the Report, I believe that it is a very positive
Report in many respects. And I think it adds a great deal to the debate over capital
punishment in this country, and its recommendations would do much to achieve greater
fairness and accuracy in the administration of the death penalty.
Second, I want to make a comment that relates to the death penalty in the United
States and how it's administered. The Report, at page four states, that it should not be
interpreted as a criticism of any existing death penalty system in other jurisdictions.
The Report does not explain why it is not a criticism of death penalties in other
jurisdictions. In reality, it is in many respects a stinging indictment of the way the death
penalty is administered throughout the United States. That may not have been the intent
of the Report, as the Report declares, but it is, in fact, a reality of the Report.
A third observation relates to the political nature of the death penalty. I believe that
it is extremely-likely that if a state like Massachusetts were to narrow the list of crimes
for which the death penalty could be imposed and make it far more difficult to achieve
a conviction in a death penalty case, there would be very few cases that prosecutors
would want to prosecute as death penalty cases. Indeed I wonder why, in a state like
Massachusetts, which has one of the lowest homicide rates in the country, the state
would want to have a death penalty at all, especially given the fact that, as the Report
itself concedes, the death penalty cannot be justified upon principles of general
deterrence.
My thinking about why the death penalty will be so resisted by prosecutors is
informed, in part, by some work I did here in Indiana in the mid- 1990s. In the early
1990s, Indiana improved the way in which we provide counsel in death penalty cases. I
don't think what we do here in Indiana is a panacea, but it is certainly better by far than
it used to be. After we improved the standards for counsel in the capital cases, I
conducted a study in which I interviewed a number of prosecutors. On promises of
confidentiality, a number of them confided in me that in view of the way defense
counsel were now representing death cases in Indiana, they didn't want to ask for the
death penalty. As one prosecutor candidly remarked to me, "it's a real knock on the
prosecutor" to ask for the death penalty and fail. It hurts at reelection.
Now I want to make several specific comments about the recommendations in the
Report. As far as death-eligible murders are concerned, like Edwin and Paula, I
certainly think narrowing the list is positive. I do have concerns about using a prior
murder conviction in Massachusetts, or in any otherjurisdiction, as a predicate for the
death penalty, because I am not sure you can have absolute confidence in the accuracy
of the prior murder conviction. That murder conviction may have been obtained under
circumstances where the representation of defense counsel was woefully inadequate.
And, Massachusetts itself has had instances, as has almost every state, of defendants
who were released because they were, in fact, innocent. So I'm troubled by making a
prior murder conviction from Massachusetts or elsewhere a predicate offense.
Of course, the Report, as noted by others, reduces the number of aggravators as a
basis for the death penalty. But, I think, like my colleagues who have already spoken,
there is no reason to think that the list will not be expanded in Massachusetts, as it has
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in other states. If you can figure out a way to keep it from expanding, I would be
interested in hearing it.
I think that you have to commend a recommendation that calls for the Attorney
General or, as Edwin suggested, perhaps a committee, to review all decisions across
the state to seek the death penalty. One of the things we know from research in this
country is that different prosecutors approach the death penalty very differently. In
some counties you will see it frequently sought and in others you won't. For example,
in Texas one may compare the situation in Harris County, where Houston is located,
and Dallas County. In Harris County, the prosecutor for many years had not changed.
This prosecutor in Harris County constantly asked for the death penalty, and far
exceeded the number of death penalty requests in Dallas County on a per capita basis.
So having an Attorney General or a committee review death penalty requests is very
commendable. However, I have to wonder whether or not over time you can achieve
the fairness that you want, because prosecutors come and go and prosecutors have
different orientations toward the death penalty. Indeed, we've seen it at the national
level where clearly there has been a different orientation towards death penalty
requests between Attorney General John Ashcroft and Attorney General Janet Reno.
Let me say a few words about the defense counsel recommendations. While I
commend the recommendations, I don't think they go far enough. It is not clear to me
from these recommendations, though it may have been intended, that something more
than objective criteria are required to qualify counsel to handle capital cases. I don't
think objective criteria are sufficient. There is some reference here to performance, but
it's not fleshed out fully and I can't really tell from the Report what was intended. But
one of the things we've learned is that lawyers can meet objective criteria because of
the number of cases they've handled previously, including capital cases, and yet they
can be terribly deficient in defending a capital case. The sleeping lawyer in Texas, I
think, would have met objective criteria for handling a death penalty case. And
therefore, it's very important that there be peer review of the prior performance of
defense counsel, so that you are examining what the lawyer did in prior cases, looking
at transcripts in prior cases, and not simply giving any lawyer who meets objective
criteria the green light to defend a capital case.
In addition, I think the whole process of deciding upon lawyers to handle capital
cases ought to be vested in an independent authority and not in judges. The American
Bar Association's revised death penalty guidelines, approved by the ABA House of
Delegates in February of 2003, recommended an independent authority to review and
certify lawyers as death-eligible and not to allow any exceptions to be made. The
Massachusetts Report, moreover, sanctions the notion of a judge waiving the
requirement of capital-eligible qualified counsel. I think that's a mistake. I think there's
a history in this country ofjudges allowing defense lawyers to handle cases when in
fact they should not have been permitted to handle the cases at all. And judges have
simply sat silently while lawyers have done some terrible things in representing their
clients in capital cases.
Let me wind this up with one or two other comments about representation. The
Report, I think, is deficient in not explicitly recognizing the importance of mitigation
specialists in capital cases. You cannot defend a capital case without having available
persons to investigate the defendant's background, gather social history information,
and have it available at the sentencing stage. The Report certainly doesn't say you can't
do that, but the matter is of such paramount significance that I believe it should have
been specifically mentioned in the Report itself.
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And, finally, I want to say a word about compensation. The Report says that there
ought to be adequate compensation for defense counsel in death penalty cases. And of
course, there should, but the Report doesn't really go beyond this brief statement. The
reality in this country is that indigent defendants in criminal cases everywhere are
represeited by lawyers who are paid at a discount. We just don't provide adequate
compensation! Ironically, in Massachusetts there are terrible problems in providing
counsel for defendants in criminal cases right now, largely because the compensation
paid to defense counsel is so inadequate. There is litigation right now before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on this issue. The fees paid to assigned
counsel-the lawyers upon whom Massachusetts relies very heavily-are $30 an hour
in District Court, $39 an hour in Superior Court, and $54 an hour in murder cases. And
increasingly, assigned counsel have been refusing to handle criminal cases. Therefore,
what you need to do is make certain that you have compensation that is far above what
is now being paid in criminal cases in Massachusetts. And we have learned that when
you don't have adequate compensation the best lawyers won't take the cases.
In the study that I did in the nineties here in Indiana I interviewed a number of the
best criminal defense lawyers in the state who also have private practices. And they
told me they would not take a capital case in the state of Indiana. At that time Indiana
was paying $70 an hour in capital cases. They said they might be willing to defend a
capital case in federal court, which was paying $125 an hour, but they were not sure.
We need to understand that the billing rates among the best lawyers in this country, on
the average, in a study reported a couple of years ago by Altman and Weil, are $275 an
hour for a partner. That's an average throughout the United States for a partner in a
major law firm. When you're asking lawyers to defend a capital case-the most
important kind of work they can undertake in the criminal area-it is absolutely
shameful that they are not better compensated.
The defense of a capital case can take upwards of 500 to 1,000 hours just for the
trial itself. That is a half year's work or more for a criminal defense lawyer. I genuinely
wonder whether Massachusetts, which thus far has been unwilling to fund defense
counsel at reasonable rates of compensation in other criminal cases, will be willing to
do so in the capital area. In Indiana we have increased, incidentally, from $70 an hour.
We have a cost of living adjustment built into the rule so that beginning January 1,
2005, the state will pay the grand sum of $96 an hour. And that's much better than
most states around the country.
THE PROCESS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL
Michael J. Sullivan
As a member of the Governor's Council I want to briefly touch on the process we
went through in producing this Report. First, it was a collection of attorneys, both
defense and prosecutors. The judiciary was represented, as was the scientific and the
legal scholar community. Professor Hoffmann mentioned that he is not sure even today
which members of the Council were death penalty proponents and which members of
the Council were adamantly opposed to any type of death penalty proposal in
Massachusetts. Quite candidly, I'm not sure either. You might be able to get a sense of
this during the course of discussion about the number of aggravating circumstances that
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